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Is an “outward expression of accord”
required for rectification in
New Zealand?
Simon Connell, University of Otago, on recent case law
T
here are two recent parallel lines of authority at
Court of Appeal level regarding whether rectification
in New Zealand requires an “outward expression of
accord”. In Davey v Baker [2016] NZCA 313 the Court of
Appeal stated (at [37]) that there was no dispute as to the
applicable principles of rectification and provided an account
of the requirements for rectification that included the need
for an outward expression of accord. However, in Robb v
James [2014] NZCA 42, the Court of Appeal stated (at [21])
that an outward expression of accord is not required and
(at [22]) that the position in New Zealand with respect to
outward expression of accord was “relatively settled”.
Law of Contract in New Zealand (Burrows, Finn and
Todd (eds) (6th ed LexisNexis, Wellington, 2018) at 353)
suggests that rectification does require an outward expres-
sion of accord and Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (Butler
(ed) (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, 2009) at 871) suggests that it
does not, but in neither text is the conflicting case law
squarely addressed.
Here, I argue that the “no outward expression of accord”
position is a better authority because the issue of outward
expression of accord is obiter in the cases that suggest it is
required. Further, I argue that the no outward expression of
accord position is preferable in principle. To be precise, the
position I support is that, in New Zealand, rectification does
not require an “outward expression of accord” as a discrete
requirement in addition to the other requirements for recti-
fication.
Cases in support of an “outward expression of accord” as
a discrete requirement do not consistently provide a precise
answer to what the requirement actually means (see Depot
Corporation v Hollis [2018] NZHC 100 at [90] and Ryledar
Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 65, (2007) 69
NSWLR 603 at [280]–[281] and [315]). Taken literally, it
could mean that, even when both parties have said to each
other that they wanted X in the contract, and X is left out by
mistake, rectification is available only if there is an additional
communication along the lines of “so, we are agreed to X”.
More plausibly, the requirement for an outward expression
of accord can be seen as limiting rectification to when the
parties communicated their intentions about X to each other,
even if there is no express communication of agreement to X.
I will return to this point later, but we will turn to the history
of rectification to trace the origin of the phrase “outward
expression of accord”.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF RECTIFICATION
The “rectification” under consideration here is rectification
for common mistake as opposed to rectification for unilat-
eral mistake (for a recent discussion of the latter, see David
McLauchlan “Refining Rectification” (2014) 130 LQR 83).
Rectification for common mistake allows a court to effec-
tively re-write (and thereby “rectify”) a document that mis-
takenly fails to reflect the parties’ common intention on a
particular point.
Rectification is an equitable remedy, developed by courts
of equity in a time when the traditional literalist common law
rules of interpretation could easily produce the result that the
legal meaning of a document was something other than what
the parties had both actually intended. Rectification has
never been lightly granted — if it were, that would under-
mine the certainty parties usually seek in executing a legal
document — and the requirement for a party seeking rectifi-
cation to establish that the parties actually intended the same
thing has always been a high one.
Historically, as James VC put it in Mackenzie v Coulson
(1869) LR 8 Eq 368 at 375: “Courts of Equity do not rectify
contracts; they may and do rectify instruments made in
pursuance of the terms of contracts”. That is, a party seeking
rectification of an instrument had to prove a completed
contract, with the terms of the contract providing the parties’
common intentions that the instrument could be brought in
line with. However, criticism began to build of the idea that
rectification of a contract should be barred “simply because
negotiation has not … crystallised into contract, until the
moment of executing the written contract” as Clauson J put
it in Shipley Urban District Council v Bradford Corporation
[1936] Ch 375 at 395. The English Court of Appeal eventu-
ally confronted the question head-on in Joscelyne v Nissen
and another [1970] 2 QB 86, and found that, while rectifi-
cation required establishing a prior consensus between the
parties, that consensus did not have to amount to a con-
cluded contract. Since then, it has been beyond doubt that
courts can rectify contracts.
Joscelyne v Nissen also marks the point where the idea of
a requirement for an “outward expression of accord” enters
the picture. Russell LJ, giving the judgment for the Court,
stated that, while no concluded contract was required, the
prior consensus must be evidenced by an “outward expres-
sion of accord” (at 98). The requirement for an outward
expression of accord received some criticism at the time
(Leonard Bromley “Rectification in Equity” (1971) 87 LQR
532) but is still part of English law.
The current requirements for rectification (excluding the
controversial “outward expression of accord”) in New Zealand
can be summarised as follows (adapted from Robb v James
at [21]):
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(1) The parties had a common actual intention about a
particular point;
(2) That common intention continued up until the point of
execution;
(3) That common intention must be objectively apparent,
in the sense that it is evident from the parties’ words
and deeds;
(4) The document in question does not reflect that com-
mon intention, and would if rectified in the manner
requested; and
(5) A consideration of equitable factors does not preclude
the remedy.
The fifth element reflects that, given the equitable origins of
rectification and its nature as a discretionary remedy, equi-
table concerns such as laches, acquiescence or delay (see
Robb v James at [40]–[51]) or the protection of bona fide
third party purchasers (see Brierly Investments Ltd v Shortland
Securities Ltd (1994) ANZ ConvR 592, (1994) 5 TCLR 615
per McGechan J at 666) might mean it is inequitable to order
rectification even when the other requirements are satisfied.
THE “OUTWARD EXPRESSION OF ACCORD”
CASES IN NEW ZEALAND
Two recent Court of Appeal cases involving rectification
have stated the need for an outward expression of accord.
The most recent is Davey v Baker, which cites at [37] the
second: Hanover Group Holdings Ltd v AIG Insurance
New Zealand Ltd [2013] NZCA 442, (2013) 12 TCLR 702.
Both cases reproduce the statement of the requirements for
rectification found in the English case Swainland Buildings
Ltd v Freehold Properties Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 560, [2002]
2 EGLR 71 at [33], and note that Lord Hoffmann approved
of them in obiter in a leading English case on contract
interpretation, Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd
[2009] UKHL 38, [2009] AC 1101 at [48]. The Swainland
Buildings formulation of rectification includes “an outward
expression of accord” as a discrete element to be established
in addition to “a continuing common intention”.
Davey v Baker concerned a dispute over an easement put
in place after a 1992 boundary adjustment that transferred
an area of land from the Daveys to their neighbours the
Pavelkas. The easement established a right of way so that the
Daveys could retain access to a hilly area on their property.
The Bakers later acquired the property from the Pavelkas in
2002, at which time the Daveys were not using the right of
way. In 2010, the Daveys decided to exercise a right to
construct a roadway provided for in the right of way, which
they thought meant that they could build a road along an old
farm track.
It was subsequently discovered that the right of way did
not follow the route of the old farm track. The Daveys then
sought to have the easement rectified to bring it in line with
the right of way that they thought they had. The Court of
Appeal found that the evidence, which included evidence
from the Pavelkas, lacked clarity about the precise location
of the right of way and fell short of proving a consensus
between the Daveys and Pavelkas (see [44]–[46]). The Court
also noted at [47] that the Bakers were subsequent purchas-
ers for value without notice of any mistake in the easement.
That would by itself be a sufficient reason for declining
rectification.
HanoverGroupHoldingsLtdvAIGInsuranceNewZealand
Ltd concerned a dispute that arose after Hanover, via their
insurance broker, renewed their insurance policy with AIG.
Hanover had wanted, and the broker thought that he had
achieved, more comprehensive cover than the policy renewal
documentation actually provided for. Hanover then sought
to have the policy rectified to reflect what they thought AIG
had agreed to. The Court of Appeal thought that the evidence
established that Hanover’s broker was under the impression
that there was a consensus about the wider cover, but not
that AIG shared his understanding of what was agreed (see
[36]–[39]). Accordingly, rectification was not granted.
THE “NO OUTWARD EXPRESSION OF
ACCORD” CASES IN NEW ZEALAND
In Robb v James, the Court of Appeal reproduced (at [21])
the elements of rectification as set out by Tipping J in
Westland Savings Bank v Hancock [1987] 2 NZLR 21 (HC)
at 30, which include that:
… while there need be no formal communication of the
common intention by each party to the other or outward
expression of accord, it must be objectively apparent from
the words or actions of each party that each party held
and continued to hold an intention on the point in ques-
tion corresponding with the same intention held by each
other party.
The Court of Appeal added that (at [22]):
The terms of that formulation were affected by the issue in
the Hancock case of whether an outward expression of
the accord as determined between the parties was neces-
sary before a rectification could be ordered. The position
in New Zealand is relatively settled and Tipping J’s 1987
formulation still applies.
And, in a footnote to [22], the Court of Appeal observed that
New Zealand’s settled position with respect to outward
expression of accord could be contrasted with that in England.
In the Hancock case, the Westland Savings Bank applied
for the rectification of a mortgage that it entered into with a
Mr and Mrs Hancock in 1973. Tipping J found that, as a
matter of plain meaning construction, the mortgage docu-
ment allowed the bank to increase the interest rate every
three years. In practice, however, the bank had increased the
rate more frequently, each time giving notice of at least one
month. The Hancocks had made their repayments as requested,
until 1985 when they found themselves in a position of
financial pressure and requested a copy of the documents.
After the discrepancy between document and practice came
to light, the Bank sought to have the mortgage rectified to
retrospectively legitimise its interest rate increases.
Tipping J was satisfied that both the Bank and the Hancocks
had intended that the interest rate could be increased as long
as the bank gave reasonable notice of at least one month.
Although Mr Hancock gave evidence that he thought that
the interest rate would remain fixed at the original rate
throughout the 20-year mortgage, Tipping J was unconvinced,
especially considering that the Hancocks never challenged
the interest rate increases.
Tipping J’s conclusions about the parties’ common actual
intention was reached by considering what they had said and
done before and after the execution of the mortgage. Tipping
J expressly rejected the need to identify an outward expres-
sion of accord — which could have required some specific
positive mention of agreement about increasing the interest
rate more frequently — but re-affirmed that the evidence for
the common intention must be “convincing” (at 9).
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THE “NO OUTWARD EXPRESSION” CASES:
BETTER AUTHORITY
When it comes to the question of whether an outward
expression of accord is needed for rectification in New Zealand,
the “no outward expression” cases should be regarded as
more compelling authorities. First of all, the Court in Robb v
James, as Tipping J did in Westland Savings Bank v Hancock,
consciously turned their minds to the requirement for out-
ward expression of accord and re-affirmed that it does not
have a place in New Zealand law. In addition, Robb v James
is a more compelling authority in that (again, like Westland
Savings Bank v Hancock) it is a case where the application
for rectification was successful.
The plaintiff purchased land from the defendant vendor.
At some point, the parties discovered the existence of what
was referred to in the case as the “lost land”: a title different
from and immediately adjacent to the title mentioned in the
agreement for sale and purchase. Both the residence and a
double garage spanned both titles to some extent. When the
vendors had themselves purchased the property several decades
before, it comprised two titles, but the “lost land” had never
been transferred to them. They later discovered that the “lost
land” title was still in the name of the estate of the previous
owner. The vendors contacted the solicitors for the estate,
who transferred the “lost land” to them without objection.
The purchasers sought to have the agreement rectified to
include the “lost land” on the basis that both parties had
thought all along that what was being bought and sold was
the whole property, now known to comprise both titles. The
Court of Appeal thought that such a common intention was
clearly established (see [39]).
In my view, these cases are compelling authorities not
simply because they turned their minds to whether or not
there should be a need for an “outward expression of accord”
in the abstract, but because they provide positive examples of
cases where rectification was warranted even without iden-
tifying a specific “outward expression of accord”. In Robb v
James, searching for an outward expression of accord about
the inclusion of the additional title may have been something
of a strained exercise, because the contract was rectified to
include a title that the parties did not actually know existed
when they entered into their agreement.
In contrast, the judgments in Davey v Baker and Hanover
v AIG simply reproduced the statement of the requirements
for rectification in Swainland Buildings Ltd v Freehold Prop-
erties Ltd without noting that the requirement of “outward
expressionofaccord”haspreviouslybeenrejectedinNewZealand.
Furthermore, the parties seeking rectification in Davey v
Baker and Hanover Group Holdings v AIG did not even get
close to the line in terms of establishing a common intention,
so the discussion of “outward expression of accord” is
clearly obiter. The High Court in Depot Corporation v Hollis
[2018] NZHC 100 reached the same conclusion (at [89]),
albeit without identifying Robb v James as an alternate
authority at Court of Appeal level.
THE “NO OUTWARD EXPRESSION” CASES:
PREFERABLE IN PRINCIPLE
Earlier, I noted that the precise meaning of “outward expres-
sion of accord” is not clear. One possibility is that “outward
expression of accord” is simply a different way of expressing
the need for the parties’ common intention to be objectively
apparent, that is, apparent from their words and deeds. If
that is the case, then the apparently conflicting authorities
can be reconciled. I would submit that the Robb v James
formulation is still preferable, because “objectively appar-
ent” is clearer and lacks the baggage of “outward expression
of accord”.
In Depot Corporation v Hollis, Associate Judge R M Bell
concluded that the “outward expression of accord” require-
ment served a legitimate purpose: it is concerned with ensur-
ing that the common intention given effect to is not a coincidence
but is the result of a consensus in the sense that that each
party intended X and, in addition, thought that the other
party was in agreement with them about X based on their
interactions (see [93]). Essentially the same concept under-
pins the contract law doctrine of offer and acceptance. The
process of offer and acceptance establishes both that the
parties intended the same thing and that their common
intention is the result of an interaction between them whereby
each has reason to believe that other agrees to the terms in
question. A contract is more than a coincidence of identical
intentions. An offer invites an acceptance and an acceptance
responds to an offer, and contract law construes the two
temporally disconnected acts as components of a single con-
tinuous interaction (see Ernest Weinrib’s The Idea of Private
Law (Harvard UP, Cambridge (Mass), 1995) at 137). Thus,
simultaneous offers on the same terms do not make a con-
tract (Tinn v Hoffmann (1873) 29 Law Times 271 (Exch.
Ch.)).
In my view, that explanation is the most plausible ratio-
nale for why some kind of “outward expression of accord”
might be desirable. Arguably though, it is just another way of
stating the need for an objectively apparent common inten-
tion. However, I do not consider that the search for common
intention necessitates a forensic search for communications
of intentions, as is suggested in the following statement from
Campbell JA in Rydelar at [315], which the Associate Judge
endorsed:
If two negotiating parties each had a particular intention
about the agreement they would enter, and their inten-
tions were identical, but that intention was disclosed by
neither of them, and they later entered a document that
did not accord with that intention, what would be the
injustice or unconscientiousness in either of them enforc-
ing the document according to its terms?
I have two concerns with that passage. First of all, it is
questionable whether a party could truly, in good conscience,
hold their fellow signatory to terms that neither intended. It
is one thing to hold another party to your intended terms
when they have reasonably led you to believe they have
assented to them, as Blackburn J’s famous dicta in Smith v
Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 allows; this is something else
entirely.
The second is that it should not be strictly necessary for
the parties to have expressly disclosed their intentions. The
need for formal communication of intentions was considered
and rejected in Robb v James and Westland Savings Bank v
Hancock. The concern that a common intention could arise
purely out of coincidence seems to be something of a straw
man, or at least an occurrence so rare that it should not drive
the general formulation of the law. Where two parties intend
that their contract includes X despite neither actually expressly
disclosing that intention, it is likely that there is something in
their shared background such that they both went into the
negotiation with an expectation that X was going to be part
Continued on page 194
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Continued from page 188
of the bargain. Or, perhaps X was never expressly disclosed
but follows naturally from other aspects of the negotiation
that were formally agreed. For example, both parties might
have had a general expectation that a bank can change the
interest rate in a mortgage by giving reasonable notice. If
there is such a shared expectation sourced in the background
rather than in the parties’ disclosures of intentions but the
contract does not actually include X, it would be unjust not
to rectify the contract to include X simply because of the lack
of disclosure. The parties’ words and conduct must be con-
sidered, but they are the beginning rather than the end of the
objective intentions inquiry and must be placed in a bigger
contextual picture.
Finally, a discrete requirement for an “outward expres-
sion of accord” cannot be justified with reference to the need
for certainty in business transactions. The requirement to
establish an objectively apparent continuing common inten-
tion is already onerous, and rectification will not be granted
when one party thinks that there is a common intention but
cannot prove it was shared, as Hanover v AIG demonstrates.
Furthermore, rectification will not be granted against the
equitable interests of a bona fide third party purchaser with-
out notice, as Davey v Baker shows. The only parties who
have rectification to fear are those seeking to take advantage
of a mistake in expression and shirk obligations that they
actually intended to take on.
CONCLUSION
There is a currently unresolved conflict at Court of Appeal
level with respect to whether rectification requires an out-
ward expression of accord. Robb v James says no, after
considering the issue. Davey and Baker and Hanover v AIG
suggest yes, but in obiter. In addition to being a more com-
pelling authority, the “no outward expression” approach in
Robb is preferable in principle. Imposing an additional require-
ment of an “outward expression of accord” serves no useful
purpose. ❒
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